

Understanding and Accounting for National Will in Strategies that Use Military Force

A Monograph

by

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Abstract

Understanding and Accounting for National Will in Strategies that Use Military Force, by LTC Christopher M. McGowan, 54 pages.

This paper argues that national will is crucial to the successful use of military force; and therefore military strategists and policy makers must understand and continuously account for the impact of national will throughout strategy development and implementation. After highlighting recent challenges regarding the use of military force by the United States, the paper examines a basic model for explaining strategy from the Army War College. While the model is useful in capturing the synergy that must exist between political and military objectives and strategic risk derived from compatibility issues of ends, ways, and means, it does not capture the risk to a strategy related to national will. A way to improve upon this basic conceptual model is to incorporate the element of national will as an integral and vital part of any strategy that involves the use of military force. National will is the foundation that both the political objective and military strategy must rest upon. As such, national will defines the limits of what is acceptable in terms of a strategy's ends, ways, and means, and also determines the amount of deviation from reality that is tolerable during a strategy's implementation. Similarly, national will is a critical component in determining the time available for the strategy to achieve desired results before change or abandonment is required. Finally, national will impacts the effort and efficiency of all of those involved in developing and carrying out the associated strategy. A strategy is more likely to be successful when national will is understood and accounted for by military strategists and policy makers because it lends itself to achieving a critical three-way balance between the people, military, and government.

While lengthy ongoing military operations convey a pessimistic outlook on the United States' ability to successfully develop and implement strategy, there are several recent examples of success that highlight the importance of understanding and incorporating national will into strategy. Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, as well as, Operations Joint Endeavor in Bosnia-Herzegovina provide excellent examples, from both a conventional and low-intensity perspective, of how political objectives, military strategy, and national will are properly synthesized and balanced throughout strategy development and implementation to ensure success. US military operations in Somalia provide a valuable lesson in how taking this critical balance between objective, military strategy, and national will for granted, even after it is obtained, can cause it to be lost and lead to strategic failure.

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Acronyms

EC	European Community
IFOR	Implementation Force
JP	Joint Publication
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCA	National Command Authority
RS	Republika Srpska
SFOR	Stabilization Force
UN	United Nations
UNITAF	Unified Task Force
UNOSOM II	United Nations Operations Somalia II
UNOSOM	United Nations Operations Somalia
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
USCINCENT	United States Commaner In Chief Central Command

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Introduction

Everything in strategy is very simple, but that does not mean that everything is very easy.

—Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*

The global security environment continues to grow more volatile, uncertain, and likely more threatening, while economic conditions and fiscal constraints reduce the resources available for the United States and its partners to deal with these increased security challenges.¹ When today's security and fiscal environment is considered alongside General (Retired) Sir Rupert Smith's 2005 assessment that Western allies have continued to enter into military engagements over the last 15 years without achieving their intended results, which he attributes to "a deep and abiding confusion between deploying a force and employing a force," alarm is raised as to the United States' ability to continue to protect its vital national interests and remain a global leader into the foreseeable future.² Given the daunting security challenges of today and a justifiable concern over limited recent success in the use of military force, it is important to try and understand why such strategies fall short and find ways to improve them. Admittedly, there are no easy answers to this complex challenge, however, it is an incredibly important cause worthy of continuous study and analysis. This paper contributes to this effort by arguing that national will is crucial to the successful use of military force; and therefore military strategists, as well as policy makers, must understand and continuously account for the impact of national will. Additionally, while General Smith's somber assessment is warranted, there are several post-cold war examples

¹ US Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review 2014* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), III-V.

² Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005), 6.

of United States' employment of military force that demonstrate how properly accounting for national will contributes significantly to a strategy's success.

National will is defined and discussed later in more detail, however, the basic definition comes from what international relations scholar, Hans Morgenthau, refers to as national morale, "the degree of determination with which a nation supports the foreign policies of its government in peace and war."³ Strategy is defined using Joint Publication (JP) 1, "a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives".⁴ The instruments of national power referred to in the definition above are diplomatic, informational, military, and economic.⁵ While the current version of JP 1 does not provide a separate definition for military strategy, this paper uses one from a previous version, "the art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force, or the threat of force."⁶ This additional definition allows delineation of the portion of a strategy specific to the employment of military force, while recognizing that a military strategy is a subcomponent and integrated part of a broader national strategy that incorporates all elements of national power to achieve national objectives. The term Operational Art from JP 3-0 is very similar to the definition of military strategy provided above, however, to remain consistent with the strategy model that is discussed

³ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006), 147.

⁴ Joint Publication (JP) 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2013), I-7.

⁵ Ibid., I-1.

⁶ Arthur F. Lykke Jr, "Toward and Understanding of Military Strategy," in US Army War College Guide to Strategy, ed. Joseph R. Cerami and James F. Holcomb, Jr. (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, February 2001), 179.

later, the terms national strategy and military strategy are used to delineate between the two types of strategy that are discussed throughout the paper.⁷

Methodology

The paper's methodology combines analysis grounded in current policy documents and academic literature with historic analysis of three operational employments of military force by the United States. To set the stage and highlight the significance and timeliness of the need to improve strategies for the employment of military force, the global security and economic environment is discussed in more detail. Next, the main theoretical analysis, consisting of three interconnected parts, is presented. First, a strategy's purpose, essential components, and risk are discussed using academic literature and a basic strategy model taught at the Army War College. While the basic model presented is useful, the analysis discusses its inability to capture the multi-dimensional complexity of strategy and the significant role national will plays. Second, national will is discussed and analyzed with a focus on understanding what it is, where it comes from, and why it is so important to the ultimate success or failure of strategy. The third part of the theoretical analysis builds upon the Army War College's strategy model by incorporating national will and its relationship with a national strategy's political objective and the supporting military strategy. This revised model highlights the importance of national will and how strategists and policy makers must understand and account for it by maintaining a three-way balance among the political objective, military strategy, and national will.

Following this theoretical analysis, the strategy and outcomes of Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, United States Military operations in Somalia, and peacekeeping operations in

⁷ Joint Publication (JP) 3, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), XIX.

Bosnia-Herzegovina are assessed. For each example, questions include: 1) Was there a strategic political objective that was defined and understood? 2) How well was national will gained and maintained over the course of the operation? 3) Was there a sound military strategy with compatible ends, ways, and means given both the strategic political objective and the national will? This paper asserts that Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, as well as, Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia-Herzegovina provide excellent examples, from both a conventional and low-intensity perspective, of how political objectives, military strategy, and national will are properly synthesized and balanced throughout strategy development and implementation to help ensure success. Additionally, US military operations in Somalia provide a valuable lesson in how taking this critical balance between objective, military strategy, and national will for granted, even after it is obtained, can cause it to be lost and lead to strategic failure.

Literary Review

The body of literature addressing strategy and national will is vast and continuously growing. Carl Von Clausewitz is considered the father of modern military strategic theory. Prominent modern academics and theorists such as Colin Gray, Lawrence Freedman, Peter Paret, and Hew Strachan have not only added tremendous insight and analysis from a historic perspective on strategic theory, but continue to add relevance and intellectual capital to contemporary discussions on strategy today and for the future. This paper relies heavily on Clausewitz's principles concerning the purpose of war, the forces that influence war, and the balance that must be maintained between them. Additionally, the complexity, challenges, and certainly limits of strategy emphasized by Gray, Friedman, and Strachan are recognized and embraced. Freedman captures the nature of strategy well in concluding "while strategy is undoubtedly a good thing to have, it is also a hard thing to get right. The world of strategy is full

of disappointment and frustration, of means not working and ends not reached.”⁸ Another common theme emphasized by strategy scholars and theorists, and relied upon in this paper, is the dynamic and changing nature of strategy in practice. Strachan ties this to his conclusion that today, strategy is more closely related to policy and politics than it is to tactics, as was the case in the 18th and 19th Century. As a result, strategy in practice, versus theory, is continuously changing just as policy and politics continuously change.⁹

The role and influence of national will in policy and strategy has been expanded upon post Vietnam, most notably by Harry Summers and the Weinberger-Powell doctrine.¹⁰ More specific to the relationship between national will and the use of military force, Dr. Jeff Kubiak, Political Science Professor at the United States Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), explores the role of the war narrative and how it is constructed as a part of a war policy to sustain the national will.¹¹ Dr. Kubiak’s discussion and analysis of national will and policy legitimacy is an important influence on this paper’s analysis.

The influence of Clausewitz highlighted above, along with twenty-five years of personal and professional study on military operations and art, certainly shapes the underlying perspective on the nature of war and use of force inherent in this analysis of national will and strategy. Additionally, the compelling analysis and conclusions of General (Retired) Sir Rupert Smith contained in *The Utility of Force* are subscribed to. Specifically, General Smith’s assessment that

⁸ Lawrence Freedman, *Strategy: A History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 608.

⁹ Hew Strachan, *The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 257-260.

¹⁰ Jim Mokhiber and Rick Young, “The Uses of Military Force,” accessed August 25, 2104, <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/military/force/>.

¹¹ Jeffrey J. Kubiak, *War Narratives and The American National Will in War* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014), 3.

the nature of modern warfare has changed from that of industrial war to war among the people is supported, along with the associated implications on the operating environment, the threat, and the use of military force.¹²

Daunting Strategic Challenges: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow

Despite the hope of a peace dividend at the end of the Cold War, events over the last 25 years show that the global security environment is complex, uncertain, and continues to threaten the security and prosperity of the United States and its allies. Unfortunately, ongoing conflicts in the Ukraine, the Middle East, and North Africa highlight today's formidable international security setting and serve as indicators that the world is likely to grow more volatile, unpredictable, and threatening to the United States, its allies, and its partners in the future.¹³ Furthermore, challenging global economic conditions and competing domestic fiscal demands increase the difficulty of improving security and stability. Economic constraints and instability not only contribute to the threat within today's global environment, they reduce the resources available to deal with it. United States National Security Guidance published in 2012 states that deficit reduction is a national security imperative and is largely dependent on a lower level of defense spending.¹⁴ Given the daunting security and economic conditions that exist today and that are likely to continue for the foreseeable future, it is imperative that civilian and military leaders make sound decisions regarding the use of military force to protect and secure United States' national interests.

¹² Smith, 18-20.

¹³ *Quadrennial Defense Review 2014*, III.

¹⁴ US Department of Defense, *Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 1.

Unfortunately, the most recent operational commitments of the military by the United States and its allies have not achieved their stated objectives and have lasted longer and cost more, in both money and lives, than was anticipated. Today, more than 13 years after initiated in response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States, the outcome of US military operations in Afghanistan still remains uncertain.¹⁵ Additionally, despite nearly nine years of combat in Iraq and claims by President Obama in 2012 that “we have responsibly ended the war in Iraq and put al-Qa’ida on the path to defeat” the United States is actively involved in military operations to defeat ISIS, formerly al-Qa’ida in Iraq, and prevent them from continuing to threaten the security and stability of Iraq, the region, and the United States.¹⁶

The high cost and limited success of military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq is consistent with several combined United Nations (UN) and US military operations since the end of the Cold War. In Somalia, what began with the initial success of US supported humanitarian assistance operations under Unified Task Force (UNITAF) in December 1992, ended in disastrous failure for the US at the Battle of Mogadishu in October 1993.¹⁷ Additionally, US supported UN Peace-keeping operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina struggled for nearly four years, as hundreds of thousands of people were killed and millions were displaced, before the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord in late 1995.¹⁸ Even then, President Clinton’s promise of ensuring a clearly defined mission that can be achieved in “about a year” turned into a significant 10-year

¹⁵ Barbara Salazar Torreon, “Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2014,” accessed September 10, 2014, <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/209263.pdf>.

¹⁶ *Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, Presidential Cover Letter.

¹⁷ Kevin Dougherty, *The United States Military in Limited War: Case Studies in Success and Failure, 1995-1999* (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Company, 2012), 151.

¹⁸ Robert Baumann, George Gawrych and Walter Kretchik, *Armed Peacekeepers in Bosnia* (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2007), 30-32.

commitment of the US Military through 2005.¹⁹ However, despite strategic failure in Somalia and a much longer than expected military commitment in Bosnia, these two military operations, along with Desert Shield and Desert Storm, provide valuable lessons for strategists on how national will is critical to the successful employment of military force.

The combination of severe and persistent global security challenges and the United States' extended period of mixed results in the use of military force create an urgent need to evaluate and improve United States' strategies for the use of military force. There has always been and likely always will be a critical, if not central, role for the use of the military, in one or more of its varied capacities, to protect the homeland and ensure US national interests. Former Secretary of Defense Hagel highlights the need for what he calls a policy of principled and engaged realism, and that "the United States military will remain an essential tool of American power and foreign policy, but one that must be used wisely, precisely and judiciously."²⁰ Secretary Hagel's comments, which stress the importance of ensuring that the use of military force is consistent with the realities of the contemporary political, economic, and security environment, are very similar to those of General Eisenhower 60 years earlier. In 1952 General Eisenhower wrote in a private diary entry, "everything done to develop a defense against external threat, except under conditions readily recognizable as emergency, must be weighted and gauged in the light of probable long-term, internal, effect."²¹

Secretary Hagel and General Eisenhower's remarks convey how difficult it is to develop and implement successful strategies that employ military force in support of US interests. A brief

¹⁹ President Bill Clinton, Transcript of President's Speech on Bosnia, November 27, 1995, accessed January 27, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/US/9511/bosnia_speech/speech.html.

²⁰ Chuck Hagel, Speech given at CSIS Global Security Forum, November 5, 2013, accessed 5 December, 2014, <http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1814>.

²¹ Robert J. McMahon, "US National Security Policy from Eisenhower to Kennedy," in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol.1, Origins*, edited by Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 289.

review of post cold war military operations demonstrates that this is not a new challenge and is certainly not one with a clear, concise, and risk free solution. However, it is a long-standing complex problem that strategists and policy makers must continue to improve upon. The remainder of this paper is dedicated to doing that by demonstrating the importance of national will and providing insights that strategists and policy makers can use to develop and implement strategies that gain and maintain national will.

Understanding and Assessing a Strategy

Building upon the definitions of strategy and military strategy initially provided, it is necessary to further understand the purpose of a strategy, the components of a strategy, and how to assess a strategy's risk.²² Not surprisingly, there are volumes written on all types of strategy and strategic theory that in some ways have confused the meaning of strategy.²³ However, this level of analysis is well beyond the scope of this paper. Clausewitz remains the foundational military strategy theorist that others build upon, and while there are many competing interpretations and opinions of his principles and ideas, he is certainly the most referenced and relied upon for credibility or justification. Clausewitz defines strategy as “the use of engagements for the object the of war.”²⁴ Building upon this foundational definition Colin Gray defines strategy as “the use that is made of force and the threat of force for the ends of policy,” viewing it

²² Joint Publication 1 defines a strategy as “a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives.” A military strategy is defined in an earlier version as “the art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force, or the threat of force.”

²³ Strachan, 26-30.

²⁴ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 128.

as “the bridge that relates military power to political purpose.”²⁵ Clausewitz stresses the importance of a purposeful and well thought out strategy when he states, “no one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.”²⁶ Clausewitz defines the purpose of war and therefore the purpose of a military strategy as achieving the political object, which he describes as the original motive for war, “The political object—the original motive for war—will thus determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires.”²⁷ This paper’s definition of a strategy and a military strategy are consistent with Clausewitz’s principles. Achieving the strategy’s overall political objective (theater, national, or multinational) is the ultimate purpose of the military strategy and it is what the military objectives within that military strategy must support and contribute to, along with the other components of national power.

The commonly accepted components of a strategy are its ends, ways, and means. The “ends” are the objectives or desired conditions, where as the “ways” and “means” are the methods and resources used to try and achieve the objectives or desired conditions.²⁸ These components are necessary and applicable regardless of the level or type of strategy being discussed. As stated earlier, the focus of this analysis is on national level strategy ends, or political objectives, and a military strategy’s ends, ways, and means. The initial base model used in this paper for understanding and analyzing military strategy is the Army War College Strategy Model developed by Dr. Arthur Lykke. He defines a military strategy as “the establishment of military

²⁵ Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 17.

²⁶ Clausewitz, 579.

²⁷ Ibid., 81.

²⁸ Freedman, XI.

objectives, the formulation of military strategic concepts to accomplish the objectives, and the use of military resources to implement the concepts” (Military Strategy = Military Objectives + Military Strategic Concepts + Military Resources).²⁹ This conception of military strategy is consistent with the commonly accepted framework described above of ends, ways, and means. In Lykke’s model the military objectives are the ends, the military strategic concepts are the ways, and the military resources are the means. Based on this model, the two critical elements that determine the likelihood of success and the risk associated with the military strategy are the appropriateness of the military objectives in facilitating the achievement of the political objective and the compatibility of the three components of the military strategy. Lykke uses the analogy of a three-legged stool to represent the military strategy that supports the objective of National Security (See Figure 1).



Figure 1. Arthur Lykke's Military Strategy Model

Source: Arthur F. Lykke Jr., “Toward and Understanding of Military Strategy,” in US Army War College Guide to Strategy, ed. Joseph R. Cerami and James F. Holcomb, Jr (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, February 2001).

The military strategy stool must support the objective of national security, analogous in this paper to the national strategy’s political end. The military strategy stool has three legs that keep it upright, and each one represents a different component of the military strategy. Lykke labels the three legs as objectives or ends, concepts or ways, and resources or means. Not only

²⁹ Lykke, 184.

must there be synergy between the military strategy's objectives and national strategy's political objectives, such that accomplishing the military objectives are an appropriate and necessary step toward achieving the political objective, the three legs of the stool must also be compatible or balanced. If there is a lack of synergy between the military and political objectives, or if the legs are out of balance with one another, for example if the military resources or means are not available to support the military concepts or ways of employment, the stool will begin to tilt and put the strategy at risk. The amount of tilt represents the amount of risk inherent in the military strategy.³⁰ (See Figure 2)




Figure 2. Unbalanced Military Strategy with Risk

Source: Arthur F. Lykke Jr, “Toward and Understanding of Military Strategy,” in US Army War College Guide to Strategy, ed. Joseph R. Cerami and James F. Holcomb, Jr (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, February 2001).

While Lykke's model is helpful in understanding the purpose of a military strategy, as well as its basic components and risk, it does not capture the multiple interdependent dimensions or elements of a strategy or the dynamic nature of the strategy process. In order to try and capture the holistic and interdependent nature of a strategy, theorists, beginning with Clausewitz, identify and describe elements or dimensions that interact in complex ways to determine strategy outcomes and risk. Clausewitz identifies five elements, Michael Howard uses four dimensions, Colin Gray describes 17 dimensions. While all slightly different, each is emphasizing the

³⁰ Lykke, 181-184.

wholeness and interdependence of variables that influence a strategy. For example Colin Gray's dimensions are divided into the three broad categories of people and politics, preparation for war, and war proper; whereas Michael Howard's four dimensions are social, logistical, operational, and technological. Therefore, while the simplicity of the basic stool strategy model is useful, it is too rigid and rational to fully capture the complex nature of a strategy, which by its nature has "many broad, pervasive, and interpenetrating dimensions."³¹

From the complexity described above it follows that strategy development and implementation is not a rigid top-down linear process. Senior political leaders should not determine political objectives in isolation, which are subsequently passed to military leaders to develop a military strategy that has military objectives in support of achieving the previously established political objectives. Strategy development and its implementation must be collaborative. Civilian and military leaders should engage in a dialogue to determine what is desired, possible, and acceptable. The political ends of a strategy that uses military force must be shaped by military options and risks, just as the military strategy, to include the concepts of employment and resources, is dependent on the political objective for which they are employed.³² Additionally, once developed, a strategy is not static and therefore must be actively managed and directed. A strategy is dynamic and must adjust to changes in objectives, environmental conditions, and other internal or external variables that can impact the strategy's ends, ways, or means.³³ Without a collaborative and continuous strategy development and management process between civilian and military leadership national political objectives and military strategy objectives will drift out of alignment, or the ends, ways, and means of the strategy will become unbalanced.

³¹ Gray, 22-24.

³² Freedman, 242.

³³ Strachan, 118.

Certainly there is no one model or theory that is fully capable of accounting for all of the complexity of strategy development and implementation discussed above. Furthermore, the uniqueness of each situation and the constantly changing nature of operating environments ensure that every problem set is different. However, by better understanding and accounting for national will, as a critical variable that impacts strategy development and implementation, strategists and policy makers are more likely to develop strategies that successfully employ military force to achieve desired political objectives.

National Will: What is it, Where does it come from, and Why does it Matter?

What is National Will?

Since this paper argues that national will is a critical factor in determining whether or not a strategy involving the use of military force succeeds, it is necessary to clearly define national will, understand where it comes from and provide justification for why it is so important to the success or failure of a strategy. As highlighted earlier, international relations scholar, Hans Morgenthau, defines national will as “the degree of determination with which a nation supports the foreign policies of its government in peace and war.”³⁴ Another scholar, John Spanier, defines national will as “popular dedication to the nation and support for its policies, even when that support requires sacrifice.”³⁵ Another similar definition, but one that is more specific to policy involving the use of military force, or what author Dr. Jeffery Kubiak defines as a war policy, is “the political sustainability of a war policy once commenced.”³⁶ All three definitions highlight the essential support and sustainability that national will provides to government policies. However, subtle differences in the definitions also raise awareness to common debates

³⁴ Morgenthau, 147.

³⁵ John Spanier, *Games Nations Play* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1993), 177.

³⁶ Kubiak, 155.

about the drivers or agents of national will and the difference between national will, public opinion, and political will. Morgenthau uses determination of a “nation,” Spanier uses “popular” dedication, and Kubiak uses “political” sustainability. Since the focus of this paper is on what national will means to strategy development and implementation, concern is more with the output or impact of national will versus the agents and mechanisms that drive it. However, some general assumptions are helpful for a better shared understanding of what is meant by national will in this paper.

In order to understand national will along with its impact on policy and strategy it is necessary to consider both policy elites and the mass public, as well as the relationship between them. “Scholars generally agree that a hybrid of the bottom-up, populist model of democracy (elites take cues directly from public opinion) and a top-down model (elite opinion fundamentally shapes public opinion) is required to account for the apparent mechanisms at work in the policy process.”³⁷ Certainly the general or mass public opinion matters and is an important, if not critical, component that contributes to national will either for or against the use of military force. Benjamin Page from the University of Chicago and Robert Shapiro from Columbia University studied the relationship between public opinion and public policy decisions from 1935 through 1979 and concluded that there is “substantial congruence between opinion and policy (especially when opinion changes are large and sustained, and issues are salient), together with the evidence that opinion tends to move before policy more than vice versa.”³⁸ However, while public opinion is an important component of national will it is certainly not the only component, as it is critical

³⁷ Ibid., 13.

³⁸ Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, “Effects of Public Opinion on Policy,” *The American Political Science Review* 77, no. 1, (March 1983), 189.

to remember “the mass public does not make policy-the policy elites do.”³⁹ Scholarly analysis varies as to the significance of public opinion versus policy elites with respect to national will and policy, however, there is a general consensus that both matter and that there is a reciprocal relationship with both leading and both listening to varying degree at different times.⁴⁰ The brief overview of scholarly analysis presented above supports the assumption in this paper that national will represents the combined support and commitment of the general public and policy elites toward government policies and actions. However, there is also emphatic recognition of the reality that the multiple agents or drivers of national will, and the complexity of how they influence it, greatly increases the challenge for strategists and policy makers that must try to understand, account for, and even predict future levels of national will.

From the definitions and discussion above, we see that national will is an intangible measure of support for and commitment to government policies and or actions as demonstrated by the mass public and policy elites. Certainly the intangible nature of national will makes it something that is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to measure precisely. In a functioning democracy like the United States, especially with nearly unlimited access to information and communication through the internet, it may be possible to capture a relative sense of national will through demonstrations, polls, voting, and the never ending 24-hour media cycle. However, there are undoubtedly still significant challenges in forming even a general sense or measure of the degree of national will, because it varies greatly across different segments of society and changes over time.⁴¹ That said, this paper assumes that it is possible to estimate a categorization of national will and determine if it is strongly in support, undetermined/mixed, or strongly against government decisions or actions. For example, following attacks on Pearl Harbor in 1941 and

³⁹ Kubiak, 10.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 13.

⁴¹ Morgenthau, 147-149.

terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 there was strong national will to support military action against the perpetrators of these attacks. On the other hand, following the Tet Offensive in Vietnam in 1968 there was strong national will against continuing military operations in Vietnam.⁴² An example of mixed or undetermined national will can be seen regarding the United States invasion of Iraq in 2003 based on claims that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. Given the scope of this paper, this broad level of classification or measurement is sufficient to understand the vital role national will has in determining the success or failure of strategy. However, emphasis on the dynamic nature of national will over time, even across these broad categories, cannot be overstated.

Where does National Will Come From?

National will is largely generated from the significance or value that society, as represented by both the general public and policy elites, place on protecting, advancing, or obtaining one or more of its national interests. National interests represent desired conditions or “enduring end states by which nations rationally prioritize their efforts.”⁴³ Clausewitz highlights the connection between national will and national interests when he states “since war is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object, the value of this object must determine the sacrifices to be made for it in magnitude and also in duration.”⁴⁴ The value that a society places upon specific national interests, and therefore the associated level of national will that is generated, varies depending on the national interest at stake. The more significance society

⁴² Smith, 238.

⁴³ David Jablonsky, “The Persistence of Credibility: Interests, Threats and Planning for the Use of American Military Power,” in *US Army War College Guide to Strategy*, ed. Joseph R. Cerami and James F. Holcomb, Jr (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, February 2001), 43.

⁴⁴ Clausewitz, 92.

places upon the national interest at risk, the greater the commitment and sacrifice associated with protecting it. “History shows that countries will absorb enormous amounts of punishment in order to protect their core strategic interests.”⁴⁵

Classifying and understanding specific US national interests is not as straightforward as it may seem. In the 2012 National Security Guidance, President Obama defines three “enduring” national security interests: the security of our Nation, allies, and partners; the prosperity that flows from an open and free international economic system; and a just and sustainable international order where the rights and responsibilities of nations and peoples are upheld, especially the fundamental rights of every human being.⁴⁶ Former Secretary of Defense Panetta’s cover letter to the same document lists six “core” national interests: defeating al-Qa’ida and its affiliates and succeeding in current conflicts; deterring and defeating aggression by adversaries; countering weapons of mass destruction; effectively operating in cyberspace, space and across all domains; maintaining a safe and effective nuclear deterrent; and protecting the homeland.⁴⁷ Furthermore, in the formal introduction to the 2012 National Security Guidance, reduction of the deficit through a lower level of defense spending is stated as a national security imperative.⁴⁸ These differences certainly highlight potential challenges that exist in communicating clear and consistent political objectives. However, they also suggest that what is likely most important about national interests is not interpretations and prioritization by strategists and policy makers

⁴⁵ John Mearsheimer, “Why the Crisis in Ukraine is the West’s Fault,” *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 2014), accessed November 16, 2015, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141769/john-j-mearsheimer/why-the-ukraine-crisis-is-the-wests-fault>.

⁴⁶ *Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, Presidential Cover Letter.

⁴⁷ Ibid., Secretary of Defense Cover Letter.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 1.

but the associated value and passion that a society communicates or demonstrates in the form of national will.

The US Army War College provides a useful approach to organizing and classifying national interests which helps understand the level of national will they are likely to engender. National interests are divided into the four categories of physical security, economic prosperity, promotion of values, and world order. National interests are also classified according to three intensity levels of vital, important, and peripheral.⁴⁹ As stated earlier, national will is an intangible that is difficult to measure, varies widely across segments of society and changes over time. However, it is still possible to gain insights and understanding of the relationship between national interests and corresponding level of national will from the general framework provided above. For example, a threat to the physical security of the United States is likely to be considered vital and create an incredibly strong level of national will for immediate large-scale government action to mitigate the threat. In contrast, violations of human values in Sub-Saharan Africa are likely a peripheral US national interest and national will for government intervention is likely to be mixed or undetermined. However, continuing to remember the dynamic nature of national will is critical. What may be considered a peripheral US national interest initially, such as human-rights violations in Sub-Saharan Africa, can quickly be brought to prominence by the media and generate strong demand that “something must be done.” Despite the challenges of predicting and or measuring national will, its critical implications toward the ultimate success or failure of a strategy that uses military force are undeniable.

Why Does National Will Matter to Strategists and Policy Makers?

The often cited Clausewitz paradoxical trinity refers to Clausewitz’s theory that war is composed of three forces: “primordial violence, or hatred and enmity, which are to be regarded as

⁴⁹ Jablonsky, 43.

blind natural force; on the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its elements of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.”⁵⁰ Clausewitz believed that it is the dynamic relationship between these forces in war, primarily embodied by the people, the commander and his army, and the government, respectively, that explains the course of war.⁵¹ Clausewitz further asserts that any theory or understanding of war that does not pay attention to and account for these forces and their balance, deviates from reality and is bound to fail.

These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another. A theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless.⁵²

From the discussion above we see that any theory of war must account for and balance the relationship between the people, the military, and the government. This is consistent with what Hew Strachan refers to as the “secondary trinity” that is formed by the actors in a nation at war, “the people, the armed forces, and the government.”⁵³ From this it follows that strategists and policy makers, those who must operationalize such theories of war in the form of a strategy, must understand and consider the people and how they relate to government policy and military strategy. In essence, they must understand and account for national will.

National will is critical to the success of any strategy since it serves as the foundation upon which the strategy must rest; influences the amount of time that is available for implementation; and greatly impacts the efficiency and effectiveness of strategy execution. Serving as a foundation for the strategy, the strength or level of national will generated largely

⁵⁰ Clausewitz, 89.

⁵¹ Kubiak, 7.

⁵² Howard and Paret, 89.

⁵³ Clausewitz, 278.

establishes the limits on the magnitude and scope of the strategy's objectives (ends), concepts of employment (ways), and resources (means). If the level of national will is low, the foundation is weak and may not support a strategy with substantial political or military objectives or the commitment of significant resources. President Lincoln understood the critical foundation that national will provides for a strategy. In 1862, he believed that the national will for preserving the Union, the national strategy's initial political objective, would not support the military actions and sacrifices that were going to be required to achieve it. Through the Emancipation Proclamation, President Lincoln increased national will by unleashing the passion associated with the antislavery movement and therefore increased the scope and magnitude of military objectives, actions, and resources that could be committed.⁵⁴ While Lincoln maintained the balance between the political objective, military strategy, and national will by increasing the national will, this is not always possible or appropriate. When that is the case, the ends or means of the strategy must be adjusted to stay within the limits of existing national will.

When national will is understood and the strategy ends are adjusted to properly accounted for it, policy makers and strategists are ensuring what Richard Betts, Director of the Institute for War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, refers to as a strategically functional compromise exists. A strategically functional compromise is one that adjusts the ends or objectives, either to maintain a coalition, avoid unwanted second or third order consequences, or to reduce uncertainty and minimize risk of a strategic setback or failure. The alternative is adjusting or compromising the means or resources that are applied. Betts concludes that it is more prudent to compromise ends and simply "set sights lower", than to comprise the means and "fire short ", however "Too often the drawbacks of the former seem clearer to political leaders than the risks of the latter."⁵⁵

⁵⁴ Kubiak, 7.

⁵⁵ Richard K. Betts, "Is Strategy an Illusion?" *International Security* 25, No. 2 (Fall 2000), 44-45.

Since the late 18th century, there have been over 200 cases of the use of US military force internationally to help achieve political objectives that protect or advance national interests. In nearly all cases, American political leaders have employed only as much force as was necessary, and no more than was politically or economically prudent.⁵⁶

Clearly, military strategists must establish military objectives, along with compatible ways and means, that are based on and directly tied to achieving the political objective they are trying to support. However, working in collaboration with senior policy makers and political leaders they must help ensure those ends, ways, and means are within the limits of what national will is likely to support. If military strategists or senior military leaders believe there is a gap between the military strategy established to achieve the political objectives and the boundaries that they believe national will supports, or that it is likely to support in the future, they must act. Strategists may be able to adjust the strategy to close the gap, so long as doing so does not create unacceptable risk elsewhere in the strategy. If not, they must ensure senior policy makers and political leaders clearly understand the potential risk they are accepting so that they can consider adjustments to political objectives. National will's foundational role, serving to establish the limits on the scope and magnitude of what is acceptable, has only increased in importance in the aftermath of strategic shortfalls in Vietnam and other post Cold-War uses of military force.⁵⁷

In serving as a strategy's foundation, national will not only impacts the boundaries for the scope or magnitude of a strategy's ends, ways, and means, it is also critical in determining the amount of tolerance or deviation from expectations that is acceptable. In order for US national will to support the employment of military force they must believe that its use is legitimate. Dr.

⁵⁶ Antulio J Echevarria, "OP-Ed: Rethinking the American Way of War and the Role of Landpower." Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College (12 September 2012), accessed August 20, 2014, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/idex.cfm/articles/Rethinkin-the-American-way-of-War-and-the-role-of-landpower/2012/09/10>.

⁵⁷ Smith, 311-312.

Jeffrey Kubiak highlights the need of both normative legitimacy and cognitive legitimacy. Normative legitimacy ensures that the value of obtaining the perceived benefit or political objective exceeds the anticipated costs. Normative legitimacy is tied to establishing the boundaries discussed above in regards to what objectives can be pursued, by what means, using what type and amount of resources, “the policy being contemplated, both in means and ends, falls within the boundaries set by the values of the particular society.”⁵⁸ Cognitive legitimacy is tied to the strategy’s feasibility or match with reality. There must be a logical connection between the policy and the supporting strategy’s objectives or ends (both political and military), ways, and means such that there is “a convincing argument regarding the feasibility of a specific policy.”⁵⁹ This logical connection or feasibility must not only be established, it must be maintained in order to sustain the national will. If reality deviates from expectations, cognitive legitimacy is questioned, normative legitimacy becomes unstable and overall national will is threatened. The lower the level of national will, the lesser amount of deviation from expectations that is likely tolerated before significant changes in national will occur.

For the strategist, this relates to the importance of maintaining balance among the three legs of the military strategy stool and adds another complexity to consider. While the amount of risk initially present in a military strategy due to moderate mismatches between resources available and planned operations may not create the degree of “tilt” capable of causing the strategy to fail, changes to the national will, as a result of a decreases in a strategy’s perceived legitimacy, can quickly magnify the existing “tilt” or risk present and cause the strategy to fail. The military strategist must minimize the likelihood of significant deviations between expectations and reality. While this is incredibly difficult, given the uncertainty of cause and

⁵⁸ Kubiak, 23.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 24.

effect relationships against a learning and adaptive hybrid threat in a complex and continuously changing operating environment, it is imperative. Minimizing significant deviations from expectations requires the military strategist to have a clear understanding of the threat and to be able to transparently communicate that understanding of the threat, along with friendly military capability and efficiency at dealing with the threat to senior policy and decision makers. Analysis and communication must not only focus on the likely risks and costs, in terms of time, money, and lives, but must also capture the possible worst-case risks and costs. It is only then that policy makers and political leaders can make proper risk informed decisions regarding strategy development and implementation.

Another aspect of national will that impacts the likelihood of a strategy's success or failure is as a critical determinant of the time available to implement the strategy. The greater the national will, the more time that is likely available to achieve established objectives and arguably the greater the probability of a strategy's success. Of course the opposite is also true. Unfortunately, the likelihood of a mismatch between the time required to achieve established strategic objectives and the time that is available as a result of national will is greater now than it has ever been before. Gen (Retired) Sir Rupert Smith highlights how modern conflicts go on and on because of a change in the paradigm of warfare from industrial war to war among the people. He attributes the increased time required for modern military operations to succeed to changes in the objectives sought, the nature of the enemy and the complexity of the operating environment.⁶⁰ However, as discussed above, national will changes over time and “the domestic political clock will almost always run faster than the military clock in the theater of operations.”⁶¹ The rate of change is affected by perceptions of success or failure and associated costs. In military

⁶⁰ Smith, 291-294.

⁶¹ Kubiak, 149.

operations, the costs are relatively easy to measure and often very visible, especially when it involves the loss of life. On the other hand, the benefits or progress is typically very difficult to measure and take a long time to achieve, especially given political nature of objectives and an operating environment among the people.⁶² The longer the use of military force continues, the more the costs rise and the more of an impact there is on a wider range of other national interests, all of which can cause a decrease in national will.⁶³ The rate of change of national will, and therefore the volatile nature of time, has also grown with dramatically increased media and information flow, a decreased tolerance for casualties, and increased expectations of sustainable prosperity and well-being.

For strategists this means that the amount of time available is not simply a function of military calculus based on what is trying to be achieved through the military concepts employing the resources available, national will must be considered. While the methods and resources available may make accomplishing the established objectives likely in a reasonable amount of time, strategists and even policy makers do not control the clock on national will. Strategists must understand that demonstrating early success by obtaining visible and measurable gains or objectives matters greatly and creates time for continued effort and progress toward longer term, potentially more significant objectives. Achieving these “incremental dividends” has been a key factor of successful US Military strategies since at least the Civil War and Liddell Hart concludes “the strategist who is the servant of a democratic government has less rein...Whatever the ultimate prospects, he cannot afford to postpone dividends too long.”⁶⁴ Similarly, the opposite is also true. Significant visible losses or early set-backs can have a dramatic impact on the time

⁶² Smith, 291-294.

⁶³ Kubiak, 149.

⁶⁴ Roger H. Nye, *The Challenge of Command: Reading for Military Excellence* (New York: The Berkley Publishing Group, 1986), 138.

available due to a loss of national will, regardless of whether or not those losses logically or rationally impact the actual attainability of the desired objectives or end states.

Finally, national will impacts the energy and commitment of everyone involved in strategy management and implementation. This directly impacts execution efficiency and effectiveness. In writing on the defeat of Napoleon by the Russian's at the Battle of Borodino, Tolstoy concludes, "victory and defeat are not to be understood as consequences of rationally managed physical and political engagements-rather they are the consequences of profoundly moral and psychological conditions."⁶⁵ Ironically this point is clearly echoed by Napoleon in his dictum that "the moral is to the physical as three to one."⁶⁶ While there are many contributors to the commitment of a military force, few are as significant as a sincere belief in purpose. History has shown time and again that the true power and capability of a military is less a function of size or technology as it is the will to endure and win.⁶⁷

In addition to national will affecting the efficiency and effectiveness of the military force conducting the operations, it also affects the efficiency and effort of those contributing the resources or developing the technology needed. Famed German physicist Werner Heisenberg was asked by Hitler's government to investigate the feasibility of developing the Atom Bomb. Given his lack of enthusiasm about the prospect of the German's winning the war, he intentionally emphasized the significance and challenges of what would have to be done. Fortunately, in America, scientists, many of them Jewish refugees from Europe, were extremely motivated to be ingenious and do whatever was necessary to get the atom bomb built as quickly as possible.⁶⁸ For

⁶⁵ Paul Seabury and Angelo Codevilla, *War: Ends & Means* (New York: Basic Books, 1989), 65.

⁶⁶ Smith, 244.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 242-243.

⁶⁸ Seabury and Codevilla, 72.

military strategists to be able to develop a comprehensive strategy that is balanced, feasible, and appropriate given the political objective they are trying to support they must take into account how national will impacts the energy and efficiency of those involved in implementing the strategy. Failure to do so can cause an over or underestimation of what is possible and or of the costs or resources required. In both cases the risks associated with the strategy increase and can lead to a strategy's failure.

A better understanding of what national will is, where it comes from and why it is so important for military strategists and policy makers to understand and account for facilitates reexamining Dr. Lykke's military strategy model. Given the implications of national will on strategy development and implementation: as a determinant of the boundaries for the scope and magnitude of a strategy's ends, ways, and means; as a critical factor in the tolerance for deviation between expectations and reality; as a key factor in determining the time available to accomplish strategic objectives; and as an important variable impacting the energy and efficiency of those implementing the strategy, it is worthwhile to try and build upon Dr. Lykke's model in a way that captures these implications and improves understanding and usefulness for strategists and policy makers.

Incorporating National Will into Dr. Lykke's Strategy Model

Dr. Arthur Lykke's Army War College military strategy model helps understand the synergy that must exist between the military objectives and the political objectives and highlights the risk that exists when the military strategy's ends, ways, and means are out of balance or not compatible with one another. However, incorporating the role of national will into Lykke's strategy model will increase its usefulness for policy makers and military strategists. By better understanding the importance of national will and its relationship with political objectives, and military strategy, policy makers and strategists may be better able to develop and implement

strategies that gain and maintain national will, reduce risk, and are therefore more likely to succeed.

The primary addition to Lykke's base military strategy model is adding national will as the foundational base that the military strategy stool must rest on. As with most physical foundations, the depth of the national will foundation, as well as the overall surface area, are the principle determinants of how much it is able to support. As was discussed earlier, the principal factor that determines the amount of national will available to support a strategy is the value the public places upon the national interest that they believe the strategy's political objective is attempting to protect or advance. When the public perceives a strong relationship between the strategy's political objective and a vital national interest, a significant amount of national will is produced. In the proposed model, this is represented by a foundation that has a relatively large depth and surface area. If there is a weak relationship between the political objectives and vital national interests, the depth and surface area of the national will foundation is relatively small.

(See Figure 3)




Figure 3. Revised Military Strategy Model with National Will Foundation

Additionally, the revised model depicted in Figure 3 modifies the box or object that the military strategy stool in Lykke's base model supports. Lykke's base model depicts the box as the broad objective of national security, (See Figure 1), where as in the model above, the military strategy stool supports a specific political objective or objectives as determined within the national

strategy that the military strategy is a component of. This is not intended as a significant theoretical or conceptual deviation from Lykke's base model. It is a refinement that attempts to capture better the synergy that must exist between military and political objectives and provide a representation of the interdependent relationship between the political objective, national interests, and national will. In the revised model the size and implied weight of the box is derived from the scope and magnitude of the political objectives that the comprehensive national strategy seeks to achieve. The more significant the political objectives, the larger and heavier the box and therefore the more robust the military strategy stool and national will foundation that supports it must be. Lykke discusses the importance of this relationship when he cites Liddell Hart's emphasis that "the military objective should be governed by the political objective" and states that the ultimate objectives of a military strategy are those of national policy.⁶⁹ However, broadly representing the object as national security misses an opportunity to highlight the importance of this relationship and the potential risk that exists when it is inadequate.

The proposed revisions capture two additional risks that must be considered and managed by strategists and policy makers. First, the military strategy stool must be robust enough, in terms of military objectives, concepts of employment and resources, or ends, ways, and means, to hold up the national strategy's political objectives adequately. When this is not the case the military stool will not tip over, as is the case when the military strategy's components or stool legs are out of balance, but rather it will fail catastrophically. Additionally, the national will must be strong enough to support the political objectives of the national strategy, as well as, the military strategy developed to support it. When it is not, failure can occur one of two ways. The national will is unable to bear the heavy weight and cracks or internal risks of the military strategy's unbalanced legs (objectives, methods and resources or ends, ways and means) are magnified by a small

⁶⁹ Lykke, 181.

surface area of national will and lead to a sudden, possibly unexpected, tip of the military strategy stool. (See Figure 4)




Figure 4. Revised Model with Additional Risk Captured

Clausewitz's paradoxical trinity described earlier, along with the "secondary trinity" described by Strachan, provides a useful way to reinforce the significance of the balanced and synergistic relationship that the modified strategy model above displays between the political objective of the national strategy; the ends, ways, and means of the military strategy stool; and the foundation of national will. Clausewitz's trinity of "passion, chance, and reason", largely portrayed by the "secondary trinity" of the people, military, and government, essentially highlights the same connection and relationship as the modified strategy model above attempts to do. The political objective provides the "reason" or motive for war, the military strategy or the application of ways and means to achieve military objectives represent the play of "chance" involved with the commander and his army, and the national will is related to the "passion" of the people. The military strategist must not only ensure the three legs (objectives or ends, concepts or ways, resources or means) of the military strategy stool remain balanced, they must work with senior leaders and policy makers to ensure that there is a macro level balance maintained between the political objective, the military strategy, and the national will or in Clausewitz's terms "passion, chance, and reason." Hew Strachan concludes:

If democratic states believe that their armed forces are fighting for democratic objectives, then the democratization of the popular battle space should in the long run produce better strategy; indeed it has to. People, the armed forces and government need to become three in one in reality as well as in Clausewitzian theory.⁷⁰

The remainder of the paper examines three examples of the use of military force by the United States. After a brief historical overview of each operation, analysis focusses on how well national will was gained and maintained, the relationship between the political objectives, the military strategy, and national will and the impact these factors had on the success or failure of the use of military force. The historic examples demonstrate that a strategy for the use of military force is more likely to succeed when it accounts for national will and is able to maintain a three-way balance between the national will, the military strategy, and the political objectives.

The Gulf War: Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm

Iraq, under the leadership of Saddam Hussein, invaded and occupied Kuwait on 2 August 1990. Iraq's actions were immediately condemned around the globe. UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 660 was adopted by a vote of 14 to zero calling it a "breach of international peace and security" and demanding Iraq's immediate withdrawal.⁷¹ Shortly after the invasion, President Bush stated emphatically "this will not stand."⁷² Over the course of the next six months United States and coalition forces completed a military build up of mass proportions in order to deter further Iraqi aggression south into Saudi Arabia as well as try to compel Saddam Hussein to

⁷⁰ Strachan, 281.

⁷¹ UN Security Council Resolution 660, accessed January 9, 2015, <http://www.un.org/Docs/sres/1990/sres90.htm>.

⁷² Richard M. Swain, "*Lucky War*" *Third Army in Desert Storm* (Fort Leavenworth: US Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1994), xxiv.

withdraw from Kuwait.⁷³ Additionally, the UN Security Council passed 10 more resolutions condemning Iraq's actions and emplacing economic sanctions and embargos.

Despite mounting international pressure, Saddam Hussein kept his forces in Kuwait and continued actions directed toward achieving his stated goal of a “comprehensive and eternal merger” with Kuwait.⁷⁴ On 29 November 1990, the UN Security Council ratified Resolution 678, which demanded complete withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait by 15 January 20015 and authorized the “use of all necessary means” to restore international peace and security if this deadline was not met.⁷⁵ On 12 January 1991, after three days of significant debate, the United States Congress approved the use of military force to expel Iraq from Kuwait. The vote in the Senate was 52 to 47, with a vote in the House of 250 to.⁷⁶ On 16 January 1991, the US led Coalition initiated what would be a 42 day long air campaign directed primarily at strategic targets in Iraq and operational Iraqi military forces in Kuwait. The air campaign resulted in gaining air superiority and reduced combat power by over 50% in front-line Iraqi units. Additionally, the destruction of critical Iraqi early warning and air defense systems, communications networks, and transportation infrastructure isolated Iraqi forces in the Kuwait Theater of Operations.⁷⁷ On 20 February 1991, President Bush gave Iraq four days to withdraw, then followed up on 22 February with an ultimatum to begin withdrawal within 24 hours or

⁷³ Ibid., 1-5.

⁷⁴ UN Security Council Resolution 662 (9 August 1990), accessed January 9, 2015, <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1990/scres90.htm>.

⁷⁵ UN Security Council Resolution 678 (29 November 1990), accessed January 9, 2015, <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1990/scres90.htm>.

⁷⁶ Adam Clymer, “Confrontation in the Gulf” *New York Times*, January 13, 1991, accessed 9 January 2015, <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/13/world/confrontation-gulf-congress-acts-authorize-war-gulf-margins-are-5-votes-senate.html>.

⁷⁷ Swain, 225-226.

accept the consequences. Iraq rejected the US-Coalition ultimatum and the ground attack started early morning 24 February. President Bush declared a cessation of offensive actions on 28 February and a formal UN cease-fire agreement was signed on 3 March 1991.⁷⁸ The end result of the 42 day air campaign and the 100 hour ground attack was the near complete destruction of the core of Iraq's military forces and freeing Kuwait from Iraqi occupation.⁷⁹ US casualties throughout the operations included 148 combat related deaths and 467 wounded.⁸⁰

To briefly analyze the role of national will and its implications on strategy development and implementation during Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the questions outlined earlier are considered. First, was there a strategic political objective that was defined and understood? Yes, the United States, as well as the international coalition, defined and maintained clear and consistent political objectives from the very beginning. President Bush announced four national political objectives in his speech from the White House on 8 August 1990: "(1) to achieve the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, (2) to restore the legitimate government of Kuwait, (3) to defend Saudi Arabia, and (4) to protect American citizens abroad."⁸¹ Throughout Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm these remained the political objectives of the United States. There was never any serious consideration for the destruction of Iraq or the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. The United States and its partners "maintained a keen eye on what the postwar regional balance of power looked like, not wishing to exchange one destabilizing imbalance for another."⁸² The political goals remained directly tied to the United States vital national interests as well as those interests of the broader international community. Iraq's actions violated the

⁷⁸ Ibid., 359.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 1.

⁸⁰ Department of Defense Persian Gulf War Casualty Summary, accessed January 9, 2015, <http://www.dmdc.osd.mil/dcas/pages/report>.

⁸¹ Swain, 31-32.

⁸² Ibid., 1.

integrity of a sovereignty state, threatened Saudi Arabia and other gulf states, disrupted the existing economic balance of power in the middle east, and threatened overall global economic stability. The national political objectives sought to overturn these serious injustices, as well as, restore peace and an acceptable level of stability, no more and no less.

Second, how well was national will gained and maintained over the course of the operation? While support for President Bush's decision to send American forces to Saudi Arabia was strong, with nearly 80% in support, the national will in support of using force to expel Saddam Hussein's Army out of Kuwait was much less certain and varied considerably between August 1990 and February 1991.⁸³ In the four polls conducted during the fall of 1990, the average percent of the population that believed it was worth going to war to get Iraq out of Kuwait was 47%, while 43% thought that it was not. In the poll conducted just before Thanksgiving 51% opposed using US forces to drive Iraq out of Kuwait. However, national will in support of military action changed significantly following the 29 November UNSCR which authorized "any means necessary", as a new Gallup poll showed a 27 percent swing in public support, with 53% now in favor, 40% opposed and 7 % unsure.⁸⁴ President Bush and his administration understood the importance of national will and used international support and prestige to help influence both the public and Congress.⁸⁵

While the resolution approved by Congress on 12 January 1991 to authorize the use of military force was viewed by President Bush to "unmistakably demonstrate the United States'

⁸³ David W. Moore, "Americans Believe US Participation in Gulf War a Decade Ago Worthwhile," Gallup Religion and Social Trends, February 26, 2001, accessed January 9, 2015, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/1963/Americans-Believe-US-Participation-Gulf-War-Decade-Ago-Worthwhile.aspx>.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Swain, 3.

commitment to enforce a complete Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait”, significant divide and uncertainty remained. This uncertainty and divide helped ensure policy makers and strategists did not take national will for granted.⁸⁶ Despite widespread support for the Air Campaign throughout January and February, with nearly 80% in favor, support for the ground attack remained relatively low, even after Iraq’s refusal to comply with two high profile ultimatums. On the eve of the ground war only 41% of Americans said the US and its allies should begin the ground war. Fortunately, the patriotic rally effect following President Bush’s decision to initiate the attack created a surge of support and a rapid overwhelming military victory, with relatively few US casualties, sustained it. In the wake of the cease-fire, President Bush received an 89% approval rating, the highest of any president since Gallup started polling in 1930.⁸⁷

Finally, was there a sound military strategy with compatible ends, ways, and means given both the strategic political objective and the national will? Yes, throughout the development and implementation of the military strategy there was complete synergy between the military objectives or ends and the political objectives they were developed to support. Military objectives remained focused only on achieving the limited political ends established. Strategic air targets outside of Kuwait were only those that threatened coalition operations in theater or enabled Iraq to sustain or support its own operations within the theater. Ground operations remained completely focused south of the Euphrates River and only enemy forces within that theater were targeted. In summarizing the cohesion and synergy between political and military efforts, former Third Army Historian Richard Swain writes, “it is hard to think of a war in which diplomatic and military actions have been better harmonized.”⁸⁸

⁸⁶ Clymer, 1.

⁸⁷ Moore, 4.

⁸⁸ Swain, 327.

Additionally, the ends, ways, and means of the military strategy were fully compatible with each other, as well as, with the level of national will. While the political and military objectives of the strategy were limited, the preparation and commitment toward achieving them were not. An appreciation and healthy respect for the size and capability of the Iraqi Army, along with pre-war casualty forecasts as high as 30,000 inspired strategists and commanders at all levels, such that “this war was to be planned from the outset as a short, violent, massive, and decisive victory whose conduct capitalized upon material abundance and professional and technological acumen as the means of reducing the human costs of the war.”⁸⁹ Concern for national will is evident throughout planning, preparation, and even during the conduct of combat operations. The importance of minimizing casualties was a constant focus throughout the operation, which at times impacted the effectiveness of operations as, “American commanders were willing to surrender tactical advantage because of the possibility that casualties by misadventure might somehow erode popular confidence back home.”⁹⁰

Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm provides a clear example of a military strategy that successfully employed military force to achieve established political objectives. Political objectives consistent with supporting vital national interests were clearly identified and understood. National will was gained and significant effort was dedicated throughout to ensure that it was maintained. The Military strategy to achieve the political objectives remained synchronized or balanced externally with the political objectives and national will and internally with compatible ends, ways and means. The political objective was well supported by a robust and balanced three-legged military strategy stool that remained securely grounded to a foundation of strong national will. Unfortunately, while this critical three-way balance was initially

⁸⁹ Ibid., xxvi-xxvii.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

established 18 months later when the United States used military force to intervene in Somalia, it was not sustained throughout the operation and resulted in a dramatic strategic failure.

US Military Operations in Somalia

Somalia rapidly deteriorated into a clan based civil-war and country with massive human suffering following the overthrow of its dictator Siad Barre in January of 1991. The violence and chaos of the civil war was exacerbated by drought, such that by October 1992 it was estimated that over 300,000 Somalis had died as a result of the combined effect of the civil war and famine. Additionally, 1.5 million more were at extreme risk of dying due to famine, with a total of 4.5 million out of the 6 million Somali population suffering from the effects of famine.⁹¹ US involvement in Somalia is best understood in three stages: Operation Provide Relief in support of United Nations Operation Somalia (UNOSOM), Operation Restore Hope in support of UNITAF, and United Nations Operation Somalia II (UNOSOM II).⁹²

On 24 April 1992 UNSCR 751 approved the formation of UNOSOM in order to observe a previously signed cease-fire agreement, provide humanitarian relief, and support an end to hostilities.⁹³ After several months of little progress on all fronts, the UN requested additional humanitarian assistance support from the United States. In August 1992, President Bush approved Operation Provide Relief, which provided a Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team, activated a Joint Task Force to conduct emergency air-lift of food supplies, and deployed four C-141s and

⁹¹ Luke Glanville, “Somalia Reconsidered: An Examination of the Norm of Humanitarian Intervention,” *International Affairs* 77, no. 1 (2001), accessed January, 15, 2015, <http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/files/2011/04/a178.pdf>.

⁹² Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1995), 11-12.

⁹³ UN Security Council Resolution 751 (24 April 1992), accessed January 20, 2015, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/751\(1992\)](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/751(1992)).

eight C-130 aircraft in support of on-going humanitarian operations.⁹⁴ Despite the increases in US administration and logistic support UNOSOM continued to fail. Only 500 out of the authorized 3,500 military security force deployed, and those that did remained confined to the Mogadishu Airport by Somalia Warlords. Intense media coverage of the expanding human suffering created tremendous pressure on the US Government to do more. By late November of 1992, President Bush could not stand the suffering any longer and called Secretary of Defense Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Powell to the White House, telling them “I-We-can’t watch this anymore. You’ve got to do something.”⁹⁵

On 3 December 1992 UNSCR 794 established UNITAF and marked the transition to the large US led peace enforcement operation, Operation Restore Hope. UNSCR 794 authorized “all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.”⁹⁶ Operation Restore Hope included 28,000 US Military personnel as well as 10,000 Coalition military from 21 countries. The US military plan included four-phases with 180 days allocated for Phase I-III tasks of securing ports, airfields, food distribution centers, and transportation routes, and 60 days for a Phase IV transition back to UN peace-keeping forces. US and Coalition forces completed all security and distribution tasks well ahead of schedule.⁹⁷ By the middle of January food was getting to all areas of Somalia and the 10th Mountain Division Commander, MG S. L. Arnold declared, “we have come very close to establishing the right environment to enable the Somalis to arrive at a “Somali solution.” US forces began redeploying back home in mid-February.⁹⁸

⁹⁴ Allard, 12.

⁹⁵ Dougherty, 151-152.

⁹⁶ UN Security Council Resolution 794 (3 December 1992), accessed 20 January 2015, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/794\(1992\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/794(1992)).

⁹⁷ Kubiak, 81-82.

⁹⁸ Dougherty, 151.

Despite reoccurring delays and disagreement between the United States and the UN throughout the transition phase, official responsibility for operations was transferred from UNITAF to UNOSOM II on 4 May 1993. At the time UNOSOM II took over, Mogadishu was relatively calm with heavy weapons stored in cantonment areas and warring gangs suppressed. Additionally, food was flowing, starvation was eradicated, and seed and livestock were being replenished. Unfortunately, warlords still showed no signs of working toward a self-sustainable long-term solution.⁹⁹ UNSCR 814, which established UNOSOM II, significantly expanded the objectives for operations in Somalia. Most notably it required the disarming of Somali clans, explicitly endorsed the rehabilitation of political institutions and the economy, and directed the building a secure environment throughout the country, to include the northern region that had declared its independence.¹⁰⁰ Despite dramatically expanded responsibility, total authorized forces decreased to 28,000, with US military support consisting of only 3,000 personnel providing logistic support and a Quick Reaction Force from the 10th Mountain Division of approximately 1,500.¹⁰¹

The calm in Mogadishu unraveled quickly as Somalia warlords fought back to maintain their weapons and took advantage of the reduced size and quality of the UNOSOM II force. Somali clan wars erupted as warlords viewed expanded UN operations as an attempt to shift the existing internal power balance and no longer as an impartial humanitarian assistance mission. UNOSOM II's expanded mission largely ignored a deep cultural sentiment of "me and my clan against all outsiders."¹⁰² A drastic turning point occurred on 5 June after Mohammed Farar

⁹⁹ Walter S. Poole, *The Effort to Save Somalia, August 1992-March 1994* (Washington DC: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005), 2.

¹⁰⁰ Allard, 15.

¹⁰¹ Dougherty, 157.

¹⁰² Ibid., 163.

Aideed's militiamen killed 24 Pakistani Soldiers. As a result, UNSCR 837 was adopted which "authorized all necessary measures" to arrest and detain those responsible for inciting or carrying out the attack.¹⁰³ UNOSOM II essentially shifted its primary focus from humanitarian assistance and nation building to capturing Aideed. Even many US policy elites believed that removing Aideed would make "all the difference". In August, the United States deployed a 440 person Special Operations Task Force to take on primary responsibility for capturing Aideed.¹⁰⁴ On 3-4 October 1993 a failed attempt to capture Aideed turned into what is known as the Battle of Mogadishu, resulting in 18 US Soldiers killed, 78 wounded and one captured. The public and political outcry was immediate and led to President Clinton announcing that all troops would come home from Somalia no later than 31 March 1994.¹⁰⁵ Without US support, the UN mission in Somalia fell apart as UNOSOM II was terminated and all peacekeepers were withdrawn by March of 1995.¹⁰⁶

Again, to analyze the role of national will and its implications on strategy development and implementation for US Military operations in Somalia the questions outlined earlier are considered. First, was there a strategic political objective that was defined and understood? While the political objectives were initially defined and clearly understood, they lost their clarity as operations changed. President Bush defined the mission of Operation Restore Hope in his 4 December 1992 speech announcing the Operation: "To open supply routes, to get food moving, and to prepare the way for a UN peace-keeping force to keep it moving." He also stated four times that the US purpose for sending forces to Somalia was to "enable the starving to be fed"

¹⁰³ UN Security Council Resolution 837 (6 June 1993), accessed January 20, 2015, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/837\(1993\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/837(1993)).

¹⁰⁴ Poole, 3.

¹⁰⁵ Kubiak, 84.

¹⁰⁶ Dougherty, 172.

and was strictly humanitarian.¹⁰⁷ However, from the time of the withdrawal of the large US military component supporting UNITAF in March 1993 until the dramatic increase in violence in June 1993 under UNOSOM II, President Clinton only mentioned Somalia once, during a welcome home speech for returning forces.¹⁰⁸ Despite the rapid increase in scope of responsibility associated with the transfer from UNITAF to UNOSOM II and the remaining 4,500 US Soldiers left to support it, there was no effort to develop or communicate a revised US strategic political objective. In commenting on the lack of clear strategic objectives related to Somalia, Walter Poole of the Joint History Office concludes, “discussions in the Deputies Committee where policy alternatives were formulated usually revolved around short-term tactics without reference to long-term objectives. Imprecision and drift seemed to reign.”¹⁰⁹ In a New York Times article published on 20 June, President Clinton was urged by its editors to “define more carefully the goals and scope of American involvement.” Then, on 14 July the New York Times editors declared, “Somalia is a humanitarian mission. The UN is a peace organization. It shouldn’t be gunning down Somalis from helicopters, no matter what warlord they support.”¹¹⁰ The confusion and uncertainty about why US forces were in Somalia and what they were supposed to be doing was widespread by the summer of 1993.

Second, how well was national will gained and maintained over the course of the operation? National Will strongly supported providing the desperately needed humanitarian assistance to Somalia, however, it weakened after this mission was completed with Operation Restore Hope, and fell apart following the Battle of Mogadishu and loss of 18 American Soldiers.

¹⁰⁷ Kubiak, 87.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 88.

¹⁰⁹ Poole, 4.

¹¹⁰ Kubiak, 94.

President Bush's decision to deploy a large military force to save millions from starvation was largely driven by the overwhelming pressure of National Will, fueled by endless videos and photos streamed into households around the world. White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater said "We heard it from every corner, that something had to be done. Finally, the pressure got to great."¹¹¹ Not surprisingly the public overwhelmingly supported President Bush's decision to send troops, with a Gallup Poll at the time showing an approval rating of 66% for the President's decision.

Strong support was maintained through May 1993 with the success of UNITAF's humanitarian assistance mission, however, national will became more divided as violence began to escalate and UNSOSOM II struggled to accomplish its bold mandate. Increased casualties, rising financial costs, and more military troop commitments combined to decrease the level of national will amongst the general public as well as policy elites through the summer of 1993.

Senator Byrd, Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, was leading the opposition to continue US operations in Somalia among policy elites. In a New York Times editorial on 19 August he stated that UNOSOM II "is quickly crumbling" and "is not worth American lives lost and injuries sustained."¹¹² A Gallup Poll in early September 1993 found that 57% of Americans believed the US should stop military actions against the warlords, whereas 53% believed the US should leave Somalia altogether.¹¹³

Following the shock of the battle of Mogadishu, the national will, driven largely by a collapse of support from policy elites, evaporated. Amongst powerful policy makers controlling funding such as Senator Byrd and Senator McCain, as well as, policy elites and statesmen such as

¹¹¹ Dougherty, 152.

¹¹² Kubiak, 95.

¹¹³ Ibid., 96.

George Kennan, there were strong demands to end operations as the mounting costs were not worth the benefits of state-building. There were many more pressing security interests to deal with and the humanitarian mission was already accomplished.¹¹⁴ Surprisingly, in multiple polls conducted immediately after the incident only 37-43% of Americans wanted an immediate withdrawal. In polls taken between 15-18 October, 28 % favored immediate withdrawal, 43% favored President Clinton's plan of withdrawal in six months, and 28% were in favor of staying as long as necessary to stabilize the country.¹¹⁵ While there was an understandable emotion toward avenging the loss and humiliation suffered by US Military forces in Mogadishu, the mismatch between costs and benefits and expectations and reality caused the foundation of national will required to sustain operations to crack.

Finally, was there a sound military strategy with compatible ends, ways, and means given both the strategic political objective and the national will? Similarly to issues of political objective and national will, the military strategy associated with UNITAF and Operation Restore Hope was sound; however, the military strategy for UNOSOM II was not. US Central Command's military objectives or ends outlined in its Operation Restore Hope mission statement were completely synchronized with achieving the political objectives outlined in President Bush's 4 December 1992 speech.

When directed by the NCA, USCINCENT will conduct joint/combined military operations in Somalia to secure the major air and sea ports, key installation and food distribution points, to provide open and free passage of relief supplies, provide security for convoys and relief organization operations, and assist UN/NGOs in providing humanitarian relief under U.N. auspices. Upon establishing a secure environment for uninterrupted relief operations, USCINCCENT terminates and transfers relief operations to U.N. peacekeeping forces.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 96-99.

¹¹⁵ Steven Kull, "Misreading the Public Mood", *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, March 1995, accessed January 20, 2015, <http://www.policyattitudes.org/misreadoped.html>.

¹¹⁶ Allard, 13-14.

Additionally, the ways and means employed to achieve the military objectives were fully compatible with each other as well as the national will. The military force of 28,000 US and 10,000 Coalition military provided the depth and flexibility to accomplish all humanitarian assistance requirements while deterring any warlord clan violence and ensuring force protection. The rules of engagement employed and the types of missions conducted were consistent with the desired objectives, the force structure available, and the threat level within the operational environment. The military strategy's results speak for themselves in that all objectives were accomplished ahead of schedule with minimal casualties or violence.

After the transfer of responsibility between US led UNITAF and UN led UNOSOM II, the military strategy lost its balance with the political objectives and national will. Additionally, there was no longer internal compatibility of the military strategy's ends, ways, and means. As the political objectives expanded to focus on disarmament and nation building, the size and quality of the military force decreased along with the level of national will in support of US participation. In terms of this paper's modified military strategy model, the size and weight of the desired political objective increased, while the strength of the military strategy stool decreased along with the foundation of national will that must be able to support both. Furthermore, while the stated overarching political objective was political and economic stability for Somalia, the military strategy focus and energy quickly became capturing Aideed, as if that was the center of gravity or magic bullet to bring about political objectives of security and stability.

Internal to the military strategy, it is clear that the ends, ways, and means were not compatible. The size and capability of the military force was far below what was required to conduct "peace-enforcement" operations once peace unraveled. Additionally, while conventional US and Coalition military forces were well-suited for the short-term and narrowly scoped security and humanitarian assistance missions under UNITAF, they were not properly trained or equipped to conduct long-term nation building operations that were going to be required under UNOSOM

II. As the operating environment continued to grow more complex and the security threat more dangerous, the mismatch between the military strategy's ends, ways, and means were only amplified. In referencing the military strategy stool, there was a tremendous amount of "tilt" inherent in the stool, or military strategy risk caused from an extremely long "objectives" or "ends" leg as compared to relatively short "ways" and "means" legs. Unfortunately, the cable that US Ambassador to Somalia, Smith Hempstone, sent to the State Department on 1 December 1992, prior to any decision to commit US forces was prophetic. In it he said, "If you liked Beirut, you'll love Mogadishu."¹¹⁷

The dramatic failure in Somalia certainly contributed to the United States' hesitancy to commit military forces to the on-going crisis in the Balkans. While some argue that this resistance allowed thousands to die needlessly, the strategy for the use of force that was eventually implemented succeeded in maintaining a lasting peace. National will was gained and maintained as was a sound military strategy focused on achieving clearly defined political objectives.

US Military Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Operation Joint Endeavor

Following Word War II, Jozef Tito recreated the independent country of Yugoslavia, consisting of six Federal Republics: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro. However, without a strong central ruling figure following his death in 1980, Yugoslavia could not survive the challenges of a struggling economy, the collapse of the Soviet Union, reduced international assistance, and rising nationalist movements.¹¹⁸ Slovenia and Croatia declared independence on 25 June 1991. While the Republic of Yugoslavia did little to challenge Slovenia's claim to independence, the large ethnic Serbian population in Eastern

¹¹⁷ Poole, 69.

¹¹⁸ Dr. Harold E. Raugh Jr, *Operation Joint Endeavor; V Corps in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1995-1996, An Oral History* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2010) 2-3.

Croatia provided the impetus for war between Croatia and Yugoslavia. Between July and December of 1991 over 10,000 people were killed and 30,000 wounded. A cease-fire was brokered in January 1992 and a UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) of 15,000 personnel was employed to help maintain peace. As the cease-fire status quo was maintained, Serb minorities gained significant autonomy from the Croatian state, a lesson not lost on Serb minorities in Bosnia.¹¹⁹

On 5 April 1992 Alija Izetbegovic declared Bosnia's independence. The European Community (EC) and the United States quickly recognized Bosnia's independence, however, internally, it was rebuked by the Serbian Republic or Republika Srpska (RS) under Radovan Karadzic. In response to EC demands to withdraw the Yugoslav Army from the newly independent Bosnia, Slobodan Milosevic only removed 20,000 soldiers and left 80,000, most of which were Bosnian Serbs. Under the leadership of Karadzic and Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladic, the RS began a campaign to create a unified state of all Bosnian Serbs. Additionally, on 5 July 1992, the Croat Union of Hercog-Bosnia emerged with its base in Grude, thus pinning the Bosnian Muslims or Bosniacs, between Serb and Croat states. By September of 1992 the RS controlled 70% of Bosnia and approximately 400,000 refugees, primarily Bosniacs, had fled northern and eastern Bosnia, as ethnic cleansing returned in World War II proportions.¹²⁰

UNPROFOR's mission was expanded into Bosnia, however, forces didn't arrive until three months later and initially were only in Sarajevo. Unfortunately, UNPROFOR was unable to control the violence over the course of the next several years.¹²¹ During the spring and summer of 1995, a reenergized Bosnian Serb offensive to end the war before the Winter backfired and produced a strong US led international commitment to do what was necessary to end the war. A

¹¹⁹ Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik, 23-24.

¹²⁰ Ibid., 24-26.

¹²¹ Ibid., 40.

combination of Bosnian Serb forces taking nearly 400 UN Peacekeepers hostage in May, a brutal attack and ethnic cleansing of over 7,000 Muslims in Srebrenica in July, and a deadly August shelling of the Sarajevo marketplace by Bosnian Serb Forces convinced the US and its Allies that dramatic change was needed.¹²² An intense air campaign, Operation Deliberate Force, was initiated to protect Sarajevo and other designated safe-areas, support a renewed Croat-Bosnian ground offensives against Bosnian Serb forces, and destroy key Bosnian Serb military assets. These military actions combined with intense diplomatic negotiation to bring the warring factions together in Dayton, Ohio, and led to the Dayton Peace Accords and creation of the Implementation Force (IFOR).¹²³ The Bosnian War had lasted for three and half years, and resulted in staggering human suffering as 2.2 million Bosnians became refugees and approximately 250,000 were killed.¹²⁴

The agreement signed in Dayton recognized the sovereignty of an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina with two distinct national entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Serb Republic. IFOR was responsible for monitoring and ensuring compliance with all military aspects of the agreement as well as certain supporting tasks. Specifically, IFOR was responsible to enforce the cease-fire, ensure the removal of all military forces and equipment from the established Zone of Separation, and to ensure the consolidation of all heavy weapons in designated cantonment areas. Additionally, IFOR would support government and non-government organizations in certain political and economic stabilization efforts, primarily the

¹²² Ivo H. Daalder, “Decision to Intervene: How the War in Bosnia Ended”, *Brookings Foreign Service Journal*, December 1998, accessed January 27, 2015, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/1998/12/balkan-daalder>.

¹²³ Raugh, 4.

¹²⁴ Baumann, Gawruch, and Kretchik, 1.

conduct of national level elections.¹²⁵ IFOR consisted of 60,000 military personnel from 32 countries, including approximately 20,000 US Military.¹²⁶

During the initial one-year mandate, IFOR accomplished their specified military objectives and supported the execution of national elections in September 1996 without any combat related casualties or significant resistance. However, election results and existing political conditions indicated that ethnic and factional tensions remained high and little had been accomplished toward establishing conditions for a self-sustainable peace. It was evident that if US forces left, Bosnia could erupt back into a civil-war.¹²⁷ As a result, UN Security Resolution 1088 established a Stabilization Force (SFOR) to maintain the safe and secure environment that IFOR created. The mandate expanded the military role to nation building through more direct support to the resettlement of refugees, assistance in capturing war criminals, and creating civil institutions. Initially SFORs mandate was 18 months, however, eventually became indefinite. US forces decreased to approximately 8,500 with SFOR and continued to decrease over subsequent years.¹²⁸ On 24 November 2004 NATO officially turned the peacekeeping mission over to the European Union and the majority of the 700 remaining US Military returned home, with a small number left to assist with continued defense reform and war crime resolution.¹²⁹

¹²⁵ Summary of the General Framework Agreement, Fact Sheet Released by the Office of the Spokesman, US Department of State, 30 November 1995. accessed January 27, 2015, <http://www.nato.int/igor/gfa-summ.html>.

¹²⁶ Raugh, 1.

¹²⁷ Mark Peceny and Shannon Sanchez-Terry, “Liberal Intervention in Bosnia,” *Journal of Conflict Studies* 18, No. 1, accessed January 27, 2015, <http://journals.hil.unb.ca/index.php/jcs/article/view/11670/12397>.

¹²⁸ Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik, 123-124.

¹²⁹ Associated Press, “US Troops Mark End of Mission in Bosnia,” *Washington Post*, November 25, 2004, accessed January 27, 2015, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A11164-2004Nov24.html>.

The strategy questions outlined earlier are considered once again. First, was there a strategic political objective that was defined and understood? Yes, there were political objectives that were defined and understood. President Clinton specified the political objectives during his speech on 27 November 1995. He highlighted the need to “stop the killing of innocent civilians, especially the children, and at the same time, to bring stability to central Europe, a region of the world that is vital to our national interests.” President Clinton also stressed the importance of US leadership to preserve a strong NATO alliance. Multiple times during his speech President Clinton emphasized that the military’s mission would be limited, precisely defined, and achievable within a definite period of time. This claim was supported by the clearly defined and limited military objectives for IFOR contained in the General Framework Agreement: enforce the cease-fire, clear the zone of separation and oversee the consolidation of heavy weapons.

Second, how well was national will gained and maintained over the course of the operation? The national will toward committing a military force to Bosnia was relatively mixed, both among policy elites and the general public, both before and during the operation. Prior to his election, President Clinton criticized President Bush for ignoring the genocide and violence in Bosnia. Additionally, within the first few days in office, Secretary of State Warren Christopher emphasized the need for America to play an active role in resolving the crisis and said “Our conscience revolts the idea of accepting such brutality.”¹³⁰ However, despite the new administrations leanings, sustained resistance from both sides of the political isle, such as Democrat Harry Reid and future Republican Presidential Candidate Bob Dole, denied the President the political capital needed to employ military force prior to 1995. In a June 1994 speech, Senator Joseph Lieberman expressed the sentiment of many policy elites when he said,

¹³⁰ Peceny and Sanchez-Terry, 4.

“We also feel that while we have an interest in the Balkans, it is not sufficient to justify American soldiers there.”¹³¹

While still remaining relatively mixed toward the commitment of military forces, national will began to shift following the dramatic changes of events on the ground throughout the summer of 1995. The failure of UN Peace-keeping forces, along with escalating violence and genocide, brought renewed claims that more had to be done. However, national will was still far short of a cry to send military forces. However, through Operation Deliberate Force air strikes and supported gains achieved by renewed Croat-Bosniac offensives, the administration demonstrated “incremental dividends” that increased the national will for more aggressive action. Additionally, strong declarations of only limited objectives and a definitive timeline helped create what Betts refers to as a “functional compromise” and persuaded the House and Senate to allow the funding to support IFOR.

Throughout the operation public opinion typically remained slightly against US military forces on the ground in Bosnia, however, improved overtime. In December 1995, Americans disapproved by a 54% to 41% margin. This remained relatively consistent through June of 1997, however, by January 1997 it had changed to where 49% favored keeping forces there versus 43% against.¹³² Military Strategists, working together with policy makers and senior civilian leadership, were able to maintain the cognitive legitimacy of the strategy and therefore were able to maintain a stable level of national will which was adequate to support limited political objectives and a relatively low risk military strategy.

¹³¹ Ibid., 6.

¹³² David w. Moore, “Americans Divided on US Troops in Bosnia,” Gallup News Service, accessed January 27, 2105, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/4285/Americans-Divided-US-Troops-Bosnia.aspx>.

Third, was there a sound military strategy with compatible ends, ways, and means given both the strategic political objective and the national will? The military strategy developed and implemented to support US military operations in Bosnia was appropriate given the political objectives and national will. The proper conditions were established through diplomatic means and the forceful use of air-power to minimize the risk to ground forces and maximize the likelihood of their success. Close coordination and communication, to include NATO military planners working with key negotiators before and during the Dayton meetings ensured that assigned military tasks were feasible.¹³³ Colonel Gregory Fontenot, commander of the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division, noted “IFOR was not a peacekeeping force. It was an implementation force that specifically had the authority to compel compliance with the treaty.” In short, IFOR had “a clear purpose and the means to achieve it.”¹³⁴

This compatibility between ends, ways, and means, along with a synergistic balance of political objective, military strategy, and national will was deliberately maintained throughout the operation. Potentially destabilizing resistance to IFOR heavy weapons inspections in the vicinity of Mount Zep was overcome through persistent diplomacy and information operations. Despite riots and harassing from aggressive Bosnian Serb military and civilian groups protecting Mladic at Mount Zep tactical level commanders demonstrated incredible restraint and patience, knowing the strategic implications of any unanticipated casualties or combat related violence.¹³⁵ Furthermore, military leaders and strategists resisted temptations to avoid operational overreach that was not clearly in line with political objectives and supported by national will. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvili stressed his guidance “I made it clear that I

¹³³ Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik, 73.

¹³⁴ Ibid., 37.

¹³⁵ Ibid., 104-112.

would not support using the military to hunt down war criminals. We weren't going to take them unless we stumbled upon them. I felt that the military had a horrible track record in chasing these kinds of criminals. Look at Mogadishu.”¹³⁶

Despite a longer than expected commitment of US and NATO military forces to Bosnia-Herzegovina, horrific violence and ethnic cleansing was stopped, stability and peace maintained, and the slow process of social and political integration and healing continues to take place. The successful strategy that guided IFOR and SFOR established and maintained a synergistic balance between political objectives, military strategy, and national will. As a result, the military strategy achieved its desired political ends through the commitment of an appropriate level of resources applied in a way consistent with established objectives and national will.

Conclusion

Despite almost 15 years of continuous combat operations in Afghanistan and renewed US combat operations in Iraq, following a brief respite after nearly nine years of war, there is little indication that much progress has been made. The security, stability, and freedom that these military operations were intended to achieve seems, at best, a long way off. Many justifiably believe that the security situation today is far worse than before these large-scale military operations began. Given this alarming past, tightening domestic fiscal conditions, and the anticipation of worsening future security threats, there is an urgent need to improve strategy development and implementation for the use of military force.

Basic strategy models, such as the one taught at the Army War College, are useful in emphasizing the importance of maintaining synergy between the political and military objectives, as well as, the necessary compatibility that must exist between a strategy's ends, ways, and means. However, such models are too rational and static and do not adequately capture the

¹³⁶ Ibid., 132.

dimensional complexity of a strategy or its dynamic nature. A way to improve upon this basic conceptual model is to incorporate the element of national will as an integral and vital part of any strategy that involves the use of military force. National will is the foundation that both the political objective and military strategy must rest upon. As such, national will defines the limits of what is acceptable in terms of a strategy's ends, ways, and means, and also determines the amount of deviation from reality that is tolerable during a strategy's implementation. Similarly, national will is a critical component in determining the time available for the strategy to achieve desired results before change or abandonment is required. Finally, national will impacts the effort and efficiency of all of those involved in developing and carrying out the associated strategy. A strategy is more likely to be successful when national will is understood and accounted for by military strategists and policy makers because it lends itself to achieving the critical three-way balance between the people, military, and government that Clausewitz and Strachan recognized as so important.

While lengthy and costly ongoing military operations convey a pessimistic outlook on the United States' ability to successfully develop and implement strategy, there are several recent examples of success that highlight the importance of understanding and incorporating national will into strategy. Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, as well as, Operations Joint Endeavor in Bosnia-Herzegovina provide excellent examples, from both a conventional and low-intensity perspective, of how political objectives, military strategy, and national will are properly synthesized and balanced throughout strategy development and implementation to ensure success. US military operations in Somalia provide a valuable lesson in how taking this critical balance between objective, military strategy, and national will for granted, even after it is obtained, can cause it to be lost and lead to strategic failure. While a detailed assessment and specific projection of these insights and lessons toward ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan is beyond the scope of this paper, Hew Strachan's assessment that "Western norms concerning the formation of

strategy at the beginning of the twenty-first century focus on the armed forces and the government but neglect the people” is enlightening.¹³⁷

¹³⁷ Strachan, 278.

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